

Lincoln Lore

The Bulletin of THE LINCOLN MUSEUM



Number 1886 / Fall 2006

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Lincoln Lore

is the quarterly bulletin of
THE LINCOLN MUSEUM

The mission of The Lincoln Museum is to interpret and preserve the history and legacy of Abraham Lincoln through research, conservation, exhibit, and education.

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Thanks to the following scholars who have provided consulting services to The Lincoln Museum for events, exhibits, and publications: Herman Belz, Joseph Fornieri, Harold Holzer, David Long, Myron Marty, and Frank Williams.

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The Life and Legacy of Abraham Lincoln




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ISSN 0162-8615

Lincoln and the Right of Revolution in the Secession Crisis

by Herman Belz

The Civil War was fought to determine the nature of the Union, the character of republican government, and the meaning of American nationality. In the Constitutional Convention of 1787 these questions provoked differing responses from southern and northern delegates. In the first half of the nineteenth century the slavery controversy exacerbated sectional differences to a "cold war" level of intensity that threatened the existence of the Union. The election of 1860, which saw four geographically defined parties competing to determine the course of national development, produced an uncertain outcome. Lincoln's election was not contested in a procedural sense, for even southerners acknowledged that it was conducted in a constitutional manner. The election was contested in the substantive and more ominous sense that the party, whose policies had been condemned in 1856 as "outlawry" by Democrat presidential nominee James Buchanan, was placed in executive control of the national government. In southern eyes, Lincoln's elevation to the presidency repudiated—by failing to reenact as every presidential election since 1789 had reenacted—the original agreement between slave and free states that slavery should receive recognition and protection in the U.S. Constitution.



Herman Belz

A war fought over commonly held yet bitterly disputed first principles of national union almost defies characterization in the standard lexicon of political analysis. North and South both claimed to be the true bearer of American nationality. Each side accused the other of constitutional error and infidelity. The nature of the conflict was such that, in a peculiarly American way, the cause of constitutionalism claimed by the sectional rivals was identified with the revolutionary principles on which the Republic was founded.

Throughout the antebellum period, southerners were the most ardent of American Unionists, as long as they were in control of the federal government. Lincoln's election caused them to become advocates of the purest and most absolute form of state sovereignty. Having demanded federal legislation to protect slavery in the territories and recover fugitive slaves, they reversed course and claimed that they were no longer under obligation to national law. They insisted that their states were—and in reality had always been—sovereign republics unto themselves, notwithstanding the fact of permanent and continuously affirmed membership in the Union. President Buchanan, not a secessionist himself, expressed the practical import of absolute state sovereignty when he declared, in his fourth annual message to Congress, December 3, 1860: "As sovereign States, they, and they alone, are responsible before God and the world for the slavery existing among them. For this the people of the North are not more responsible and have no more right to interfere than with similar institutions in Russia or in Brazil."

The claim of a constitutional right to secede at the will and pleasure of the people of a state was a claim of sovereign immunity. Like the doctrine of popular sovereignty espoused by Senator Stephen A. Douglas, albeit with more threatening implications, secession was a demand for noninterference in a people's domestic affairs and institutions. Democratic popular sovereignty and proslavery secession were nineteenth century equivalents of what in the twentieth century would be referred to, paradoxically, as the "right of privacy" in

Little Round Top at Gettysburg. Photo by Elizabeth Whitney, a student at The Gettysburg Semester.

matters of the most conspicuous public interest and moral import. Then, as now, the relationship between public authority and private interests in a pluralistic society were controversial, especially in the federal system of divided sovereignty.

Lincoln rejected the notion that individual citizens and states, appearances to the contrary notwithstanding, were not under legal and moral obligation to national authority, but were at liberty to decide which laws of the Union they would obey. When South Carolina began preparations to secede, Lincoln stated privately that the “right of a state to secede was not an open and debatable question. It was fully discussed in Jackson’s time, and denied not only by him but also by a vote of Congress.” To a Tennessee visitor the President-elect said: “to execute the laws is all that I shall attempt to do. This, however, I will do, no matter how much force may be required.”

In the First Inaugural, Lincoln stated the fundamental objection to southern disunion: “Plainly, the central idea of secession, is the essence of anarchy.” Secessionist thinking transformed the legitimate idea of minority rights into the perverse notion of permanent minority rule. Secession was “rebellion sugar coated,” he said in the special message to Congress, July 4, 1861. It was an “ingenious sophism” that led logically to the disintegration of any constitution and political community which recognized it.

The alternative to minority rule, and the subversion of republican liberty that it necessarily entailed, was the tradition of national majority-rule orthodoxy. In Lincoln’s memorable formulation of the principle in the First Inaugural: “A majority, held in restraint by constitutional checks and limitations, and always changing easily, with deliberate changes of popular opinions and sentiments, is the only true sovereign of a free people.” The founders of the Republic, in Lincoln’s view, were not anarchists or advocates of minority rule, claiming immunity from British rule. They were American constitutionalists who, when confronted with British imperial oppression, claimed the natural right of the people to alter or abolish tyrannical government and institute new government for their safety and happiness.

On numerous occasions in the years before the Civil War, Lincoln reminded his countrymen that the Union was founded on the natural rights principles of life, liberty, equality, and consent set forth in the Declaration of Independence. Included among these rights as a safeguard of liberty and limitation on government was the right to revolution. Properly understood, the right to revolution was not a license willfully to place oneself outside or above the law. Grounded in reason and dictated by prudence, it was the moral right to appeal to the first principles of justice and right under “the Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God.”



Stephen A. Douglas (TLM #65)

In political rhetoric, the right of revolution bespeaks violent resistance and rebellion. In fact it is possible to alter or abolish government by peaceful political means. The state and federal constitutions written and ratified by popular consent in the Founding era were designed as a substitute for armed rebellion as a means of altering or abolishing unjust and abusive government. The constitutions to which the Revolution gave rise were intended permanently to secure the liberty that was the end of national independence. In no rational sense can it be said that constitution-making to preserve the fruits of the American Revolution somehow conferred the right of revolution on individuals or states as a legal privilege and immunity. Nevertheless, because it was a reminder and safeguard of the natural rights basis of republican constitutionalism, the right to revolution could not be abrogated or abolished from American political life.

John Locke, the philosopher of natural rights, wrote that far from an invitation to rebellion, the doctrine of “a power in the people of providing for their safety a-new,” when government violated its trust, was “the best fence against rebellion.” Americans were Lockean. In the crisis of the Union their familiarity with and dependence on Locke for their civic education were confirmed by their political leaders’ efforts—in a rhetorical sense virtually obligatory in the American political tradition—to recognize and take into account the right of revolution in justifying proposed courses of action. The three most prominent sectional spokesmen of the day, to wit, Jefferson Davis, James Buchanan, and Abraham Lincoln, illustrate the complicated relationship that existed in the nineteenth century between constitutionalism and the right of revolution.

Although secession presented itself in southern rhetoric as a claim of constitutional right, Jefferson Davis, in a notable speech in the U.S. Senate, January 10, 1861, justified southern disunion as an affirmation of American revolutionary principles. The creation of the Republican party, Davis asserted, was a “declaration of war” upon southern institutions. Secession was therefore an exercise of the right to revolution properly construed as a response to antislavery lawlessness. It signified the exercise of the original sovereignty of the people of the seceding states, a sovereignty left undiminished and unqualified by their ratification of the Constitution.

Davis viewed the right of revolution as the natural right of secession. It was an affirmative right that imposed on others—citizens and governments alike—a moral duty and legal obligation not to interfere with the actions of the seceding states. Davis admonished: “we are confusing language very much. Men speak of revolution; and when they say revolution, they mean blood. Our Fathers meant nothing of the sort. When they spoke of revolution, they spoke of an inalienable right.” It was the right of the people to abrogate or modify their government when it failed to answer the ends for which it was established. The right was not to be sustained by brute force. Davis argued: “They meant that it was a right; and force could only be invoked when that right was wrongfully denied.” “If Great Britain had admitted the great American doctrine, there would have been no blood shed.” Appealing to Enlightenment reason, Davis asked: “Are we, in this age of civilization and political progress, when political

philosophy has advanced to the point which seemed to render it possible that the millennium should now be seen by prophetic eyes; are we now to roll back the whole current of human thought, and again return to the mere brute force which prevails between beasts of prey, as the only method of settling questions between men?"

President James Buchanan, in his annual message to Congress on the eve of South Carolina secession, offered a second interpretation of the right of revolution in the crisis of the Union. Although sympathetic to southern values, the venerable leader of the northern Democracy strongly denied that secession was a constitutional right. He argued instead that the right to revolution was the proper means by which southerners should resist northern states' interference with slavery. The "malign influence" of a quarter century of abolitionist agitation, Buchanan said, had inspired "vague notions of freedom" among the South's slave population. As a result, "a sense of security no longer exists around the family altar. This feeling of peace at home has given place to apprehensions of servile insurrections." Referring to the proposition that "Self-preservation is the first law of nature," the president warned that if apprehension of internal security should pervade the masses of the southern people, "then disunion will become inevitable."

In Buchanan's opinion, however, the election of Lincoln, held in strict accordance with the Constitution, did not justify dissolving the Union. Quoting from the Virginia Resolutions of 1798, he declared: "In order to justify a resort to revolutionary resistance, the Federal Government must be guilty of 'a deliberate, palpable, and dangerous exercise of powers not granted by the Constitution.'" "Reason, justice, a regard for the Constitution," Buchanan advised, "all require that we shall wait for some overt and dangerous act on the part of the President-elect before resorting to such a remedy."

Of course the President-elect himself had given much thought to the right of revolution throughout his political career. In dealing with the secession movement Lincoln recognized its significance. In 1856, amidst intersectional charges of disunionism provoked by the struggle over territorial slavery, Lincoln bluntly asserted that if the South tried to dissolve the Union, "*we won't let you.*" "We, the majority," he said, "would not strive to dissolve the Union; and if any attempt is made, it must be by you, who so loudly stigmatize us as disunionists." "This Government would be very weak, indeed, if a majority, with a disciplined army and navy, and a well-filled treasury, could not preserve itself, when attacked by an unarmed, undisciplined, unorganized minority." Plainly, Lincoln viewed secession, the South's preferred instrument of disunion, as insurrection and rebellion. In December, 1860, he wrote to a Republican political strategist: "I believe you can pretend to find but little, if any thing, in my speeches, about secession; but my opinion is that no state can, in any way lawfully, get out of the Union, without the consent of the others; and that it is the duty of the President, and other government functionaries, to run the machine as it is."

In the First Inaugural, Lincoln recognized the importance of the right to revolution in arriving at a sound political understanding and constitutional construction of the crisis of the Union. Affirming his conviction that no state could of its own volition lawfully retire from the Union, he

said "acts of violence, within any State or States, against the authority of the United States, are insurrectionary or revolutionary, according to circumstances." At the same time, Lincoln acknowledged the existence of the right of revolution. He stated: "If, by the mere force of numbers, a majority should deprive a minority of any clearly written constitutional right, it might, in a moral point of view, justify revolution—certainly would, if such right were a vital one." More broadly, Lincoln appealed to the country's founding principles. "This country, with its institutions, belongs to the people who inhabit it," he declared. "Whenever they shall grow weary of the existing government, they can exercise their *constitutional* right of amending it, or their *revolutionary* right to dismember, or overthrow it."

Lincoln's intent was not to deny the right to revolution, which on several occasions he had acknowledged, most notably in his speech on the Mexican War in 1848. His purpose was to establish the right to resist unjustified rebellion. Strange as it may seem in retrospect, this was not as easily accomplished as one might think. Not only defenders of slavery, but also many abolitionists were open to the idea that secession was an alternative expression of the right of revolution.

Indicative of this point of view among antislavery reformers was James Freeman Clarke's essay, *Secession, Concession or Self-Possession: Which?* (1861). Clarke argued that if a state considered itself oppressed in the Union, it had a right to leave the Union peaceably. Secession was "only another name for peaceable revolution;" it was an affirmation of the principles of self-government in the Declaration of Independence. Like Jefferson Davis, Clarke averred that "If the British government had agreed to our independence, our revolution would have been peaceable secession." With impeccable logic, Clarke reasoned: "The greater includes the less. If a State has a right to obtain its independence by force, it certainly has a right to obtain its independence peaceably. I do not see how those who grant the right of revolution can deny the right of secession."

Clarke was realist enough, however, to carry his analysis to the point of considering the practical effect of the syllogism he propounded. A paradox presented itself. If the North used force to keep the states in the Union, and the South attempted to secede by force, Clarke wrote, "Secession has now become revolution and what was wrong, if done peaceably, has become right when done forcibly." Clarke could see no sense in this line of reasoning, except for one thing: "It shows that a State is so much in earnest that it is willing to fight for it. It will not act lightly, but will count the cost of fighting for its independence." Denial of secession as a constitutional right served the end of stability and order. Clarke concluded: "Thus by granting the right of revolution, but denying the right of secession, we prevent a dissolution of the Union, except under the gravest circumstances. But if we admit a right of secession to a State whenever it will, by passing a vote, we make the Union a rope of sand and destroy the stability of government."

Lincoln was correct: the idea of secession was the essence of anarchy. The Confederate attack on Fort Sumter proved the theory of peaceable secession to be a dangerous delusion, as northern Unionists had long contended. Driven by the spirit of state sovereignty and proslavery imperium, the South inaugurated an

internecine war that, in the mind of Unionist war makers and reconstruction planners, presented the prospect of state suicide.

The South's decision to undertake armed secession served as the "appeal to heaven" recognized in social contract theory as the ultimate means of deciding the reason and justice of revolutionary resistance. John Locke wrote in the *Second Treatise on Government* that when rebellion occurs, the question arises: "*Who shall be judge*" as to whether the government or the legislative body of the people act contrary to their trust? In Locke's view, this "cannot mean, that there is no judge at all: for where there is no judicature on earth, to decide controversies among men, *God in heaven is judge.*" Locke held that God alone was "judge of the right." "But *every man is judge* for himself, as in all other cases, so in this, whether another hath put himself into a state of war with him, and whether he should appeal to the Supreme Judge."

Lincoln affirmed his understanding of Lockean teaching in the First Inaugural. He declared: "The Chief Magistrate derives all his authority from the people, and they have conferred none

upon him to fix terms for the separation of the States. The people themselves can do this if they choose; but the executive has nothing to do with it." Lincoln reasoned further: "Why should there not be a patient confidence in the ultimate justice of the people? Is there any better, or equal hope, in the world? In our present differences, is either party without faith of being in the right? If the Almighty Ruler of nations, with his eternal truth and justice, be on your side of the North, or yours of the South, that truth, and that justice, will surely prevail, by the judgment of this great tribunal, the American people." With the hard won consent of his fellow citizens, Lincoln vindicated the judgment of the people who elevated him to the presidency by successfully treating secession as unjustified rebellion.

About the Author

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Did President Lincoln Order the Assassination of Jefferson Davis and the Burning of Richmond?

by Burrus M. Carnahan, Lt. Colonel, USAF (Ret.)
Vienna, VA

(Editor's note. This statement is a response to the article on The Dahlgren Raid which appeared in the Spring 2006 issue of Lincoln Lore.)

On average, 200 Union soldiers died every day during the Civil War. If the assassination of Jefferson Davis and his cabinet would have shortened the conflict by even a few days, I don't doubt that Abraham Lincoln would have given the order. There is, however, no good reason to believe that Lincoln ever thought that assassinations would shorten the war or help win it.

By 1864, Lincoln had formed very definite ideas about the nature of the war and how it could be won. He viewed the war as a problem of physics—the Union needed to mobilize the superior resources of the North and apply these resources to create overwhelming pressure on key points in the seceded states. Lincoln's "general idea of this war" was already well developed by January, 1862, when he wrote General Buell "... that we have the *greater* numbers, and the enemy has the *greater* facility of concentrating forces upon points of collision; that we must fail, unless we can find some way of making *our* advantage an overmatch for *his*; and this can only be done by menacing him with superior forces at *different* points, at the same time"¹ He restated the concept more briefly two years later to reply to a critic of the use of colored troops. Enlisting Black soldiers, he wrote, "... is not a question of sentiment or taste, but one of physical force, which may be measured, and estimated as horse-power and steam-power are measured and estimated."²

This theory of the war left little room for individual leaders, especially political leaders, to have much impact on its outcome (except, of course, for Lincoln's perennial problem of finding a general who understood his war aims). In general, little military advantage would be gained by assassinating individual enemy leaders. In particular, Lincoln would have had no reason to expect that wiping out the Confederate cabinet would have any significant military effect at the time of the Dahlgren raid in February, 1864. "Decapitating" the enemy's leadership might have made some sense in the spring of 1862, or later in the summer of 1864, when the Army of the Potomac was in striking distance of Richmond and could have taken advantage of confusion in the Confederate capital. At the time of the Dahlgren raid, however, that Army was still in winter quarters on the Rapidan River, in no position to exploit a leadership vacuum in Richmond.

Far from advancing the Union cause, the assassination of Jefferson Davis in early 1864 would have undercut one of Lincoln's favorite projects. He hoped that his December 8, 1863, amnesty and reconstruction proclamation would eventually weaken the Confederacy by convincing significant numbers of white Southerners, and perhaps even whole states, to return to their allegiance to the Union. Dahlgren and Kilpatrick carried copies of the proclamation and, whatever other objectives their raid may have had, distributing these among the enemy population was a primary goal of the President. Summarily executing Jefferson Davis and his colleagues in cold blood would have completely undercut the credibility of the amnesty promises in the proclamation.

The wholesale slaughter of the Confederate cabinet could have given new life to the prospect of British intervention in favor of the South. In 1832, the British government had seriously considered intervening in a civil war in Portugal because it was widely feared that the victors would kill their prisoners of war. On that occasion the King's Advocate, the official advisor on matters of international law, told Lord Palmerston that barbarous and inhuman treatment of prisoners might legally justify intervention, but that the British government should only intervene when it was clear that abuse was actually occurring, and not act on "apprehension of what may possibly occur." The actual murder of Jefferson Davis and his cabinet would have met the threshold for British intervention as defined by the King's Advocate.

In light of these factors, it does not seem credible that skilled statesmen of the caliber of Lincoln and Stanton would have approved such a poorly thought-out project as the assassination of Davis and his cabinet. It is more likely that this half-baked scheme came from the mind of a bold but immature officer who had not fully thought through the practical implications of his plans.

The plan to release thousands of prisoners of war to burn the city of Richmond was similarly foolhardy. The government knew that a large percentage of these men would have been malnourished, sick or wounded, and unfit for a rapid march to Union lines, let alone for looting and burning. Kilpatrick and Dahlgren would have had their hands full just supplying and moving this mass of humanity down the peninsula to the nearest federal outposts, while also protecting its members from recapture en route.

Any prisoners dispersing in small groups to loot and destroy civilian property would almost certainly be recaptured or killed by the irate citizens of Richmond, by Home Guards, or by J.E.B. Stuart's cavalry. Dahlgren intended to warn his own troopers that, if they became separated from the main body while in Richmond, they faced "an ignominious death at the hands of [the] citizens."³ Yet using prisoners to burn the city would have doomed the very men he had been sent to rescue to the same ignominious fate. The Northern public would have been outraged to learn that the Army had rescued thousands of their sons, fathers and brothers, only to send them on what was in effect a suicide mission to burn civilian property for no clear military benefit. Again, this does not sound like a plan developed by experienced officers or approved by mature public officials. Instead, it sounds like something thought up on the spur of the moment by a young and daring officer who did not always exercise good practical judgment—i.e., by Ulric Dahlgren.

Endnotes

- ¹ Lincoln to General Buell, January 13, 1862, in *Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln*, vol. V, p. 98.
- ² Lincoln to Charles D. Robinson (draft), August 17, 1864, in *Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln*, vol. VII, pp. 499, 500.
- ³ Dahlgren papers, *Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies*, vol 60, pp. 178–79.

Lincoln Lore Interview with Allen Guelzo

Q Let's start with *Abraham Lincoln: Redeemer President*. I was particularly interested in this book because I had read your earlier book on Jonathan Edwards. Did the Edwards research lead you to the eventual topic of this book on Lincoln?

A. Yes, and surprisingly directly. I'm really an American intellectual historian—a historian of ideas—and my graduate work had been done at the University of Pennsylvania (under Bruce Kuklick) on Edwards and the problem of free will, which Edwards dealt with in his big opus of 1754, *Freedom of the Will*. What resulted from that work was a book which traced the development of the free-will problem in American religion and philosophy up through 1850. I had been planning a second book, taking the free-will debate from 1850 onward, and spent a year as a Fellow of the Charles Warren Center for American Studies at Harvard working on it. In the process, I remembered that Abraham Lincoln had talked about free will and "fatalism," so I thought it would be interesting to include Lincoln in the galaxy of characters who would appear in the new book.

I can't claim to have been entirely a fresh fish on the subject of Lincoln. I'd first encountered Lincoln on the pages of a *Classics Illustrated* biography in 1962. As a senior in high school, I wrote a senior thesis on Lincoln's nomination in 1860, and got the ticket

as the narrator in the school orchestra's performance of Copland's *A Lincoln Portrait* in 1971. I bought my first serious Lincoln book—an autographed copy of Stefan Lorant's photo-biography—from a small bookstore on Walnut Street in 1973. When I began teaching as a graduate student at Drexel University in the '80s, I was assigned to teach Civil War, and the course material I worked up for that eventually became *The Crisis of the American Republic* in 1994, a textbook on the Civil War in the now-defunct St. Martin's Press American history series.



Allen Guelzo

But the defining moment was when Lincoln and free will mysteriously intersected there at Harvard. I wrote a paper on Lincoln and free will, "Lincoln and the 'Doctrine of Necessity'" for the 1995 symposium hosted by the Abraham Lincoln Association

in Springfield. It was an extraordinary moment, standing in the Hall of Representatives where Lincoln had delivered the "House Divided" speech, and the paper was well-received (and subsequently published in the *Journal of the Abraham Lincoln Association*). A month or two later, Mark Noll (who had been part of the same symposium) called to ask if I was interested in writing a Lincoln book for a series of religious biographies which Wm. B. Eerdmans Co. was publishing. I knew enough about the Lincoln literature to know that most of what had been written about Lincoln and religion was dismally poor history, and I told Mark I really didn't want to sink into that swamp. He called again, and again I said no. Finally, the managing editor at Eerdmans, Chuck Van Hof, called and told me that if I didn't do the book, he'd have to turn to Professor ——. I knew Professor ——, and knew that Lincoln was definitely not his long suit. So, I made a counter-offer: let me write, not a book on Lincoln and religion, but an intellectual biography of Lincoln which would take in the whole scope of his ideas, including religion. Chuck agreed, and the book was written. So, Edwards yielded to Lincoln, and I've never finished the free will project.

Q Both men were masters of language. Were there similarities in the manner in which they approached the subject matter which they had chosen to present? Differences?

A. It's all differences. Edwards's writing *is* masterful, but in a very different way from Lincoln's. Edwards labored to smother an opponent logically, and so his prose has a gigantic inevitability to it, even by 18th century standards, like a three-decker ship-of-the-line delivering a broadside. Bear in mind, of course, that Edwards was a polemicist, struggling to keep Puritan Calvinism upright when people in his time were falling off on either the side of hard, mechanistic determinism or completely autonomous indeterminism; and he was, professionally, a thinker—a theologian and philosopher. Lincoln was neither theologian nor philosopher, although books and ideas were, in fact, very important to him. He was a politician, and a man with only the most minimal personal religious profile. And while Edwards wrote to snatch victories from his philosophical peers, Lincoln wrote and spoke to persuade juries. There's an enormous difference between the two strategies.

Q You state: "beholding Abraham Lincoln as a man of ideas," there is a "difficulty we have had in conceding that the American republic has any intellectual history at all." Why do we have this view?

A. In large measure, this is a product of post-Civil War pragmatism. The war scarred American intellectuals, who saw the awful carnage of 1861–1865 and the bitterly disappointing results of the post-war Reconstruction, and concluded that ideological crusades like abolition and emancipation only turned people into violent, irreconcilable partisans. Williams James, Charles Sanders Peirce and Oliver Wendell Holmes became the father-figures to pragmatism, which sought to locate truth, not in fixed absolutes that men would kill to promote or protect, but in experience. Ideas cease to have meaning or coherence within themselves, and instead acquire "value" depending upon whether they solve problems. The popularity of pragmatism, which became a sort of reigning American philosophy between the Civil War and World War I (and still holds a powerful sway over American philosophers

today—think of Richard Rorty), led historians of ideas to read the prior history of American ideas through a pragmatic lens, and to celebrate those figures who looked like the forerunners of pragmatism. Franklin and Emerson, who were decidedly short on serious philosophy but long on practical nostrums, became the heroes; Edwards and the 19th century moral philosophers were cast off as orphans. It's a terrible way to read the American 19th century—something on the order of ignoring Melville, Hawthorne, and Twain in favor of Fanny Fern and Timothy Shay Arthur as the exemplars of 19th century American literature—but it's convinced us that Americans did no serious thinking in the 19th century, and that Americans are naturally inclined more to practical actions than impractical ideas. That would have surprised 19th century Americans: Josiah Royce, who taught philosophy at Harvard in the post-Civil War decades, once wrote, "Wherever you go, you find the typical American sensitive to ideas, curious about doctrines, concerned for his soul's salvation, still more concerned for the higher welfare of his children, willing to hear about great topics, dissatisfied with merely material objects, seeking even wealth rather with a view to more ideal uses than with a mere desire for its sensuous gratifications, disposed to plan great things for his country and for his community, proud of both, jealous for their honor, and discontented with the life that now is. ...He encourages science and learning. He pauses in the midst of the rush of business to discuss religion, or education, or psychical research, or mental healing, or socialism." The memory of that America has now been almost completely wiped out by the legacy of pragmatism.

Q Along the same line, you state: "The sheer magnitude of Lincoln's accomplishment as president has always tended to obscure the intellectual materials from which it was constructed." Please expand on this statement.

A. We have the curious notion that Lincoln's great achievements—emancipation, the preservation of the Union, the re-structuring of the American economy, the movement of government into economic improvement through the railroad and homestead acts—were somehow accidents which had grown spontaneously from Lincoln's goodness of heart or depth of character, rather than the systematic application of a political ideology. Lincoln himself tended to minimize the role played by his own thinking in these developments when he kept telling people that he had "drifted" into the war's events, and that he had been more guided by events than a guider of them. This, I suspect, was said more to deflect criticism that he was an ideologue than as a serious self-description. The fact is that every one of those achievements was rooted in long-term intellectual debates about the nature of law, the nature of democratic government, and (of course) free will.

Q You won the prestigious Lincoln Prize for both *Redeemer President* and *Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation*. Did the earlier book lead naturally into the book on emancipation?

A. Indirectly, yes, in the sense that as I worked through Lincoln's most important documents, I was surprised at the volumes of commentary written on the Gettysburg Address, the Second Inaugural, the debates with Douglas in 1858, and even the Lyceum speech. But there was almost nothing on the Emancipation Proclamation,

save only for John Hope Franklin's book, written for the 1963 centennial of the Proclamation. The reigning wisdom on the Proclamation was contained pretty much in one pithy but acidic phrase of Richard Hofstadter, that it "had all the moral grandeur of a bill of lading." This was peculiar, just on the face of it. The document which killed slavery, and which Lincoln testified was his greatest achievement, stood alone, like the kid always chosen last for the baseball team. This looked a lot like Conan Doyle's dog-that-didn't-bark, and so I went at it.

Q Would you agree with or refute the argument by some radical abolitionists that Lincoln should have acted earlier?

A. I don't see how Lincoln could have. Leaving aside the fact that he was temperamentally averse to the absolutism of the abolitionists—he regarded people like Wendell Phillips and John Brown in the same way one might think today of Eric Rudolph or Randall Terry. The basic and immovable truth he had to live with was that he had no civil authority as president to intervene in what were, after all, the affairs of the states. Slavery, remember, was not a creation of federal law, but of individual state laws. On the other hand, his military authority as Commander-in-Chief seemed to give him greater scope to decree emancipation as a military necessity—to deprive the rebels of a war resource—but there was next-to-nothing in the way of jurisprudence about what his military authority really was. If he used the president's "war powers"

to issue an emancipation proclamation, he had to expect that it would be challenged in the federal courts after the war, and there was no guarantee whatsoever that a federal judiciary with Roger Taney at its head would uphold him. This is why, on the one hand, he cancels the martial-law emancipations issued by Frémont and Hunter, and on the other, why he tries to chivy the border state legislatures (starting with Delaware in 1861) into accepting a federal buy-out and emancipating their slaves themselves. By mid-1862, however, his buy-out proposals had been thrown back in his face, the Union military was looking politically unstable, and there was no telling whether the window of opportunity for emancipation was in fact closing. So, he turned to a military proclamation. However, he never lost his anxiety that the federal courts might undo it all, which is why he kept pressing for a legislative solution, which finally took the form of the 13th Amendment.

Q Did the issuance of the Proclamation help to pave the way in the public mind for the eventual ratification of the 13th Amendment? Or would the Amendment have proceeded in the same manner and at the same pace without the Proclamation?

A. Amending the Constitution to abolish slavery—not just emancipate slaves, mind you, but actually abolish the entire legal institution and concept—was a political impossibility in Lincoln's first Congress. Even with a large Republican majority in both



L. Prang & Co, after Thulstrup *Battle of Gettysburg*, July 3, 1863, 1887 (TLM #4472)

Houses, only a handful of those Republicans were seriously committed to anything such as outright abolition, and I suspect that a good deal of this hesitation arose from no one really having any idea of what might happen after abolition. No matter how much someone might oppose slavery, the prevailing racism of the times made white Americans think twice before putting themselves in a situation where they had to decide about what was going to be done next with a population of four million newly-freed black slaves. The example of West Indian emancipation was mixed at best; the examples of San Domingue in the 1790s and the Indian Mutiny of 1857–58 suggested that, at worst, the abolition of slavery might be followed by race war. (This is one reason, by the way, that so many whites were interested in colonization—it was partly racial distaste, but it was also partly fear for themselves). In that context, the Proclamation actually provided a powerful argument in favor of the Amendment, because none of the dire warnings about race war and bloody slave uprisings came to pass after the Proclamation. The Proclamation demonstrated that abolition was safe—and more than safe, the Proclamation’s sanction for black enlistment seemed to make abolition necessary for Union victory. Even so, the first introduction of the Amendment in Congress in 1864 failed. It was not until the whopping mandate given to Lincoln by the 1864 election that sufficient support finally appeared in Congress to pass the Amendment—and even then, the vote in the House in January, 1865, was a squeaker.

Q I think that our readers would be interested in hearing about your program at Gettysburg.

A. It would be hard to think of a better place on the planet to create an undergraduate program in Civil War Era Studies than Gettysburg, and at Gettysburg College. Curiously, the program—as a *program*—was not really set up until 1998, when the College obtained a starter grant from the Henry R. Luce Foundation. We’ve just undergone a mandated review by the Luce Foundation, and got not only a three-year renewal, but an increase in funding.

The Civil War Era Studies program has two parts:

1. A *Civil War Era Studies minor*, for Gettysburg College undergraduates. This is a rotation of six courses, starting with a basic Civil War survey course and including courses on Civil War literature, slavery and emancipation, the Civil War on film, Abraham Lincoln, and finally two senior-level seminars in which we do hands-on walk-overs of Civil War battlefields and read the best in current Civil War research. Students who minor in CWES can major in any other program or field offered by the College. While we get a lot of history majors becoming CWES minors, we also have majors in management, biology, political science, and even a few who haven’t made up their minds yet.
2. *The Gettysburg Semester*. This is a program which allows undergraduates from other colleges and universities to spend a fall semester at Gettysburg, concentrating on courses from the CWES rotation (and especially those two big seminars). It’s very much like a study-abroad program, except that students go, not to another continent or country, but to another century—the 19th century. Like study-abroad programs, the credits students

earn through those courses go right back to their home institutions. We have tuition-exchange arrangements with numerous colleges which allow a painless transition back-and-forth in terms of costs; and where we don’t have those arrangements, we have four scholarship funds to help out. This past year, we had eleven Gettysburg Semester students, and fifty-one Civil War Era Studies minors (the CWES minor is actually larger than some majors on the campus).

I should say, too, that in addition to these academic programs, we also have a student-run Civil War Club, and our own re-enactment unit, the Pennsylvania College Guard. They are the most hilariously energetic, wild-and-crazy assembly of young people you could ever want to meet. And the knowledge of the Civil War they already bring to the table as freshmen simply frightens me.

Q What will be the subject of your next book?

A. The Lincoln-Douglas debates of 1858. We have a number of interesting books on the subject—I think particularly of Harry V. Jaffa’s classic *Crisis of the House Divided* and David Zarefsky’s book on the rhetoric of the debates—but there is a need for a good narrative history of the debates that’s well-soaked in the letters, documents and newspapers of Illinois in 1858.

Q Please comment on the 2009 Lincoln bicentennial and your plans/hopes for it?

A. I don’t know if I have what you might call ‘plans’ for 2009. Like Lincoln—and like Edwards, too, I suppose—I will “attempt no compliment to my own sagacity. I claim not to have controlled events, but confess plainly that events have controlled me.... God alone can claim it.”

About the Author

Allen C. Guelzo is the Henry R. Luce Professor of the Civil War Era and Professor of History at Gettysburg College. He is the author of *Abraham Lincoln: Redeemer President* and *Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation: The End of Slavery in America*.

Abraham Lincoln, President-Elect: The Four Critical Months from Election to Inauguration

By Larry D. Mansch
(Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2005).

Reviewed by Martin P. Johnson, Professor of History, Miami University Hamilton

Is there a more important moment in American history than the secession winter of 1860 to 1861? Those few months brought the destruction of the republic created by the Founders and the beginning, in Lincoln's election and inauguration, of our nation's commitment to the "new birth of freedom" announced at Gettysburg and embodied in the Emancipation Proclamation and the post-Civil War amendments to the Constitution. The great schools of Civil War historiography have made this ground their preferred field of interpretive combat, while students and scholars of Lincoln have long recognized that this moment offers a unique opportunity to understand the most admired American: these months represent at once the culmination of his life's work, the greatest test he had yet faced, and the essential foundation of his service to the nation during its most tragic and glorious years.

In re-telling the story of Abraham Lincoln as President-Elect, Larry D. Mansch, a lawyer and educator in Montana, has chosen not to confront these large issues, but instead he pursues a more limited goal which he describes as "examining the people and events that surrounded Lincoln as he prepared to become president". (2) The author succeeds in this essentially descriptive task, providing a nicely written, if sometimes contradictory, introduction to some of the key events and episodes of these four months. The principle strength of this work lies in the skillful way that he leads the reader from topic to topic, often adding the telling detail about some incident or inserting a vivid thumbnail sketch of someone Lincoln encountered on his journey to the presidency. Mansch has an admirable ability to seamlessly interweave details and incidents spanning a wide variety of topics, from Lincoln's upbringing, to biographies of the 1860 candidates, to Sam Houston, to Springfield in the 1850s, to Millard Fillmore. This facility with words and topics makes the entire book an enjoyable and effortless read despite its limited aspirations.

The Preface suggests some points of departure, but none leads to expansive vistas or wider interpretive horizons. "Immediately after Abraham Lincoln was elected president," Mansch writes in his opening sentence, "the nation began to fall apart" (1). This suggestion that Mansch may be about to argue that the Civil War was a highly contingent event, one that was shaped decisively by the months in question, is undermined by the next sentence, which informs us that the country in this period "began its inevitable slide toward war." Similarly, Mansch will note that the Peace Convention was "doomed" to failure (114). On the one hand, the repeated assertion that the key processes "began" during the period in question is not developed, and is in any case contradicted by the relatively large part of the book devoted to the familiar crises over slavery and expansion since the Mexican War. On the

other hand, it is never made clear in what ways these months can be deemed "critical" if the entire exercise is doomed to result in an inevitable conclusion. Deterministic arguments usually look to long-term factors and structural elements in explaining the march of events, but Mansch remains relentlessly positivistic throughout. Events, actions, and discrete episodes occur one after another with little attempt to link them into patterns or structures that can illuminate the alleged inevitability of developments. Doom is announced, but not explained.

Successive sentences in the Preface then depict feverish efforts toward compromise that are contrasted with a strangely disconnected Lincoln who "all but dismissed" these efforts (1). Lincoln is portrayed after his election as blithely ignoring the formation of the Confederate government, telling jokes, and repeatedly assuring the crowds that came to see him that "all would yet be well." Mansch places that phrase in quotation marks, but according to the online edition of the *Collected Works* at alincolnassoc.com, Lincoln is not known to have used those words. "All would not be well, of course," Mansch tells us (2). This "of course," avoiding as it does many of the key questions about why things would not be well, and based as it is upon a misuse of a Lincoln quote, turns out to be an accurate portent of the interpretive and scholarly limits of the book.

Mansch's hints in the Preface that through political ignorance, rigidity, or blindness Lincoln may be responsible for the war turn out to be another road not taken. By the time we reach the First Inaugural, Mansch wholly absolves Lincoln of moral or political responsibility. Lincoln's speech had stated his case, and now "the next move, if there was to be one, was up to the secessionist states" (205). Apparently this next move was not determined by Lincoln's actions and decisions, and was not Lincoln's fault, or even inevitable. This, even though earlier Seward had been depicted as voting against the Crittenden Compromise at Lincoln's insistence, "all but insuring that war would come" (99). The Preface and the book in general point to so many directions because there is no guiding marker to set a course.

Mansch's narrative skills are most clearly on display when he turns to the story-line of events that take Lincoln from a young man on the Illinois frontier to the steps of the Capitol in 1861. The first sixty of the book's 207 pages of text are devoted to this nicely composed exposition of biographical and political background and to a lengthy description of election day in Springfield. Moving rapidly through a broad range of topics and rarely pausing to examine issues, controversies, or mysteries in detail, Mansch presents an unproblematic Lincoln in a straightforward narrative. Lincoln is both man of destiny and man of the people: everyone somehow always knew that he was "destined for greater things" (20), but he was always "a common man" (47). Mansch is not much interested in the standard biographical controversies he passes along the way. Regarding Lincoln and Ann Rutledge, for example, Mansch tells us that "the exact nature of their relationship has never been made clear" (25).

The two-week train trip from Springfield to Washington consumes another sixty pages of the book. Mansch likely considers this the core of his book, as his short Preface pays the rail journey particular attention. There, Mansch suggests that Lincoln decided to make an extended trip to build support for his policies after a campaign during which he had said almost nothing of substance. But this is almost all we are told about the planning of the journey, Lincoln's possible hopes for the trip, or the role it might have been intended to play in a larger political strategy. Even in the extensive coverage of the details of the trip, handled, as usual, with Mansch's typical aplomb, there is little attention given to the question of what, if anything, Lincoln might have thought about his experience. Did Lincoln perhaps gain a new understanding of the nation he was to lead in its moment of trial? Does the journey reveal Lincoln in a light that is unexpected, controversial, or illuminating—tyrant in waiting, hostage to industrialists, blundering naif, backwoods Machiavelli? In two sentences Mansch states that at Indianapolis Lincoln spoke of his future administration's policies, but then we move on to yet more crowded hotel corridors, receptions of local dignitaries, and lumpy mattresses (134). There are only sporadic hints that Lincoln's journey to his inauguration was a political and personal odyssey and not simply a series of events.

The extended attention given to background material and the emphasis on the rail journey to Washington leaves less than ninety pages to consider most of the period from the election to the inauguration. This means that the book can present only a rapid overview of fifteen of the seventeen weeks during the "four critical months" evoked by the subtitle. Perhaps in part because of this forced pace, there are a number of errors or miscues. Mansch asserts, for example, that it was the Dred Scott decision in 1857 that "brought about Lincoln's return to the political arena" (188), even though he had already called the 1854 Kansas-Nebraska Act "the precursor of Lincoln's entry into politics," meaning re-entry, one assumes (40). Now, an interesting argument could be made that Lincoln merely dabbled in politics during the years from his return from Washington until his campaign against Douglas. It might be illuminating, for example, to consider the ways that Lincoln's relatively ineffectual political maneuvers and actions in the early to mid-1850s revealed indecision more than determination, Lincoln as Hamlet rather than as hero. Instead, it is clear that Mansch does not challenge the consensus view about the importance of the Kansas-Nebraska Act in Lincoln's political development. Mansch is not presenting a new interpretive vision, but seems to have misspoken.

Similarly, in a section on the crucial issue of Lincoln and slavery in the early 1850s, Mansch notes that Lincoln "could take comfort that slavery would not be extended westward into the territories by virtue of the famed Missouri Compromise" (40). Mansch certainly knows of the Compromises of 1850, which under the doctrine of "popular sovereignty" did allow for the extension of slavery into some of the lands seized from Mexico, so this would seem to be a simple oversight. Similarly, we are told that Lincoln's "first view of slaves" came in 1831 "while on his raft trip" down the Mississippi (39), but no mention is made of the earlier trip, and Lincoln had of course seen slaves before that time. Everyone makes mistakes, but Mansch is so pressed by events, often covering decades-long developments in a few sen-

tences, that he cannot do justice either to his own understanding of events or to his readers. These errors or misstatements undermine some of the work's most obvious justification as a nicely-written introduction to the politics of Secession Winter.

Some of these faults may be due to the limited scholarly foundation of the book. The Preface asserts that "in addition to the better-known works," the book relies upon "sources that are sometimes overlooked or underappreciated" (2). This claim to be based upon on a foundation of unexpected sources raises hopes that collapse upon closer inquiry. The vast majority of the book relies heavily upon modern secondary sources, which is perhaps part of the reason that Mansch does not fully develop his own vision of this period. There is a sprinkling of citations to sources that might be considered off the beaten path: some sheet music published in 1860 and a 1985 booklet by Illinois Benedictine College on Lincoln's years in Springfield. The bibliography lists one book published during the Civil War, the first volume of *The American Conflict* by Horace Greeley. Mansch notes that Lincoln's complete correspondence is available on-line through the Library of Congress, but he never cites this fundamental source. The recollections of John Hay, William Herndon's informants, Thurlow Weed, and the other usual suspects are used effectively to add color and texture to events, but Mansch does not compare alternate accounts of key events to get at either what may have actually happened or at contemporary perceptions about what may have happened. Indeed, there is little recognition here that there are alternate accounts of key events.

The book ends with Lincoln having retired to bed after a taxing inauguration day. "He went to sleep," we are informed, "with the growing realization that no matter what he did, or what he said, the country would soon be at war" (207). How Mansch knows about Lincoln's growing realization as he drifted off to sleep is not made clear. And is it so inconceivable that had Lincoln given up Fort Sumter, war would have been avoided? Inevitability has returned, that tested and true method for avoiding explaining things, and the demoralized reader is left wondering what all the fuss of the preceding 207 pages had been about. Inevitably, the nation began to fall apart upon Lincoln's election (1), and just as inevitably, Lincoln could do nothing about it (207). Between the first sentence of this book and the last, these "four critical months" pass without anything critical having happened, after all.

Historians have sometimes aspired to write history "from below," from the perspective of the common people. This is history from the outside, a book that at times strikingly depicts the exterior details of the "people and events" that "surrounded" Lincoln. Because of an uncritical approach to the topics addressed and because of its foundation of limited scholarship, *Abraham Lincoln, President-Elect*, for all its narrative power, does not go beyond external features to reveal the inner character of either Abraham Lincoln or the events of the era.

Living in Lincoln's World: 19th Century America

(Editor's note. As we approach the 2009 bicentennial of the birth of Abraham Lincoln, Lincoln Lore will frequently publish articles which will be designed to put Lincoln into the context of his time. In this first article, a timeline of "Lincoln's World", his personal events are bolded.)

1809

- **February 12, Abraham Lincoln is born in Hardin County, Kentucky**
- March 4, James Madison is inaugurated as 4th President
- Washington Irving, under a pseudonym, publishes *A History of New York*
- Death of Thomas Paine

1816

- **Lincoln family moves to Indiana**
- Indiana is admitted to the Union as the 19th state
- James Monroe is elected President

1818

- **October 5, Nancy Hanks Lincoln dies**
- African Methodist Episcopal Church is founded in Philadelphia
- Illinois is admitted to the Union as the 21st state
- Abigail Adams and George Rogers Clark die



William Lloyd Garrison H. W. Smith, Boston (TLM #2558)

1831

- **March... Builds a flatboat for Denton Offutt**
- **April... Makes second flatboat trip to New Orleans**
- **July... Arrives in New Salem**
- January 1, William Lloyd Garrison publishes the first issue of *The Liberator*
- November 11, Nat Turner leads a slave revolt
- December 5, John Quincy Adams takes his seat in Congress. Will be a leader in the anti-slavery movement
- Edgar Allen Poe publishes *Poems*
- John Greenleaf Whittier publishes *Legends of New England*

1834

- **January... Begins work as a surveyor**
- **August... Elected to Illinois state legislature**
- **Begins to study law**
- Cyrus McCormick patents a grain reaper
- U.S. receives word that slavery has been abolished in England

1836

- **Re-elected to Illinois state legislature**
- **Licensed to practice law**
- Alamo falls
- First *McGuffey Reader* published
- Emerson publishes *Nature*
- Roger B. Taney named Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
- Publication of de Tocqueville's *Democracy in America*

1837

- **April 15, moves to Springfield**
- **Becomes law partner of John T. Stuart**
- March 4, Martin Van Buren is inaugurated
- Nathaniel Hawthorne publishes *Twice Told Tales*
- Procter & Gamble and Tiffany & Company are founded

1838

- **Re-elected to Illinois state legislature**
- Frederick Douglass escapes from slavery
- James Fenimore Cooper publishes *The American Democrat*

1840

- **Re-elected to Illinois state legislature**
- National election won by "Tippecanoe and Tyler Too"
- Publication of *Two Years Before the Mast* (Dana), *The Pathfinder* (Cooper), *The Village Blacksmith* (Longfellow)



Onstot Cooper Shop, New Salem, Illinois (TLM # 1852)

1832

- **Defeated as candidate for Illinois state legislature**
- **April–July... Serves in Black Hawk War**
- January 6, New England Anti Slavery Society founded
- Chief Black Hawk is defeated
- Andrew Jackson is re-elected. Martin Van Buren is Vice President.

1833

- **May 7, Appointed Postmaster at New Salem**
- John Deere first produces a steel plow

1842

- **November 4, Marries Mary Todd**
- Phineas T. Barnum takes over the American Museum in New York City

1844

- **Forms law partnership with William Herndon**
- **Campaigns as elector for Henry Clay**
- Stephen Collins Foster publishes first song, "Open Thy Lattice, Love"
- May 24, "What hath God wrought" Samuel F. B. Morse transmits first telegraph message between cities
- Poe publishes *The Purloined Letter*
- Charles Goodyear receives a patent for vulcanizing rubber
- James K. Polk is elected
- Mathew Brady opens a photography studio in New York City

1846

- **Elected to Congress**
- Elias Howe patents sewing machine
- Daniel Emmett writes "Blue Tail Fly"
- New publications by Melville, Whittier, Poe, Hawthorne, Cooper
- Smithsonian Institution is founded

1849

- **Introduces bill to abolish slavery in District of Columbia**
- **Becomes first (and only) United States President to secure a patent**
- Gold rush in California
- Henry David Thoreau jailed for refusing to pay poll tax
- New publications by Whittier, Thoreau, Parkman, Longfellow

1852

- **Delivers eulogy for Henry Clay**
- Harriet Beecher Stowe publishes *Uncle Tom's Cabin*



Harriet Beecher Stowe (TLM #1941)

1854

- **October 16, In Peoria, Illinois, responds to a speech by Stephen Douglas**
- Kansas Nebraska Act is passed
- Thoreau publishes *Walden*
- S. C. Foster writes "Jennie with the Light Brown Hair"

1855

- **Won lawsuit for Illinois Central Railroad**
- **Begins work on McCormick reaper case**
- Walt Whitman publishes first edition of *Leaves of Grass*

1858

- **June 16, "House Divided" Speech**
- **Seven debates against Stephen A. Douglas**
- **Fails to win seat in U.S. Senate**

- Mason jar patented
- Longfellow publishes *The Courtship of Miles Standish*
- Ladies Christian Association (later to become YWCA) founded

1860

- **February 27, Speech at Cooper Institute**
- **May 9, Nominated in Chicago**
- **November 6, Wins presidency**
- James Whistler finishes "Blue Wave"
- Longfellow writes "Paul Revere's Ride"
- U.S. population reaches 31,000,000
- December 20, South Carolina secedes

1861

- **February 11, Leaves Springfield for Washington**
- **March 4, Inauguration**
- **Calls for 75,000 volunteers**
- April 14, Firing on Fort Sumter
- Dorothea Dix named Superintendent of Nurses
- Yale grants the first Ph.D. degree in the United States

1862

- **July 2, Signs Morrill Land Grant College Act**
- **Early September...writes "Meditation on the Divine Will"**
- **September 22, Issues Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation**
- Julia Ward Howe writes "Battle Hymn of the Republic"
- Thoreau dies

1863

- **January 1, Signs Emancipation Proclamation**
- **October 3, Proclaims the last Thursday in November as Thanksgiving**
- **November 19, Gettysburg Address**
- Tom Thumb marries
- John D. Rockefeller establishes a petroleum refinery in Ohio
- Edward Everett Hale publishes *Man without a Country*
- Death of Clement C. Moore, author of *A Visit from St. Nicholas*

1864

- **Wins re-election**
- **Vetoes the Wade-Davis bill which called for radical reconstruction**
- April 8, Senate approves 13th Amendment
- Nathaniel Hawthorne and Stephen Collins Foster die
- "In God We Trust" appears on U. S. coins
- J. P. Morgan & Company founded

1865

- **March 4, Second Inauguration**
- **April 14, Shot by John Wilkes Booth**
- **April 15, Dies at 7:22 a.m.**
- **May 4, Buried in Springfield**
- John D. Rockefeller founds Rockefeller and Andrews
- Union Stock Yards open in Chicago
- December 18, 13th Amendment ratified

Abraham Lincoln's Foreign Policy

by Hans Trefousse

Distinguished Professor of History Emeritus, Brooklyn College
and The Graduate Center of the City University of New York.

Author of *First Among Equals: Abraham Lincoln's Reputation
During His Administration*

For many years, it has been believed that by and large, Lincoln concerned himself with domestic matters, particularly military questions, leaving his Secretary of State William H. Seward in charge of foreign affairs. That this analysis is not entirely correct, however, has already been shown by such writers as Howard Jones, Dean B. Mahin, and Robert W. Winks,¹ and the evidence for this insight is plentiful.



Hans Trefousse

To be sure, it is true that the advocates of Seward's primacy can cite incidents to bolster their contention, especially Lincoln's statement to the secretary shortly after his arrival in Washington that he would leave matters of diplomacy, about which he knew little, to his subordinate.² But he soon showed that his disclaimer was not accurate. In his well known reply to Seward's April 1, 1861, suggestion to provoke a foreign war and to have his secretary take the helm showed at the very beginning who was in charge, a fact underscored by his amelioration of Seward's message to Charles Francis Adams, the envoy to Great Britain, in order to prevent war with that country.³

How much Lincoln was involved in foreign policy can be seen in Seward's notes to American ministers abroad. Again and again, the secretary invoked the authority of his chief. To argue that this may have been a mere formality overlooks the fact that already in his first circular to all diplomats abroad he stated succinctly, "I am now instructed by the President of the United States to inform you that...he renews the injunction which I have mentioned and relies upon the exercise of the greatest diligence and fidelity on your part to counteract and prevent the designs of those who would invoke foreign intervention to overthrow or embarrass the republic."⁴

To illustrate the president's involvement with diplomacy, it is best to examine his relations with individual countries. Of these, Great Britain was most important. Most of American trade was with that country; its navy controlled international waters, and its adherence to the blockade was therefore of the utmost consequence. How Lincoln interfered with Seward's bellicose instructions to Charles Francis Adams, the American minister to the court of St. James, is well known; he toned down some of Seward's aggressive phrases and insisted that the actual text not be shown to the British

foreign office. Deeply resenting the British recognition of the belligerency of the Confederacy which seemed to question America's free exercise of its right to suppress insurrection, he instructed Seward to communicate to the British government the definitive views of the president on this grave subject.⁵

Above all, he was anxious to prevent any sort of foreign interference in the Civil War. As his secretary of state wrote to Adams on June 3, 1861, "the principal danger, in the present insurrection, which the President has apprehended was that of foreign intervention, aid, or sympathy." This was as true of mediation offers as of actual intervention. As Adams learned in instructions dated June 19, "The President expects you to say on this point to the British government that we appreciate the generous and friendly demonstration, but that we cannot solicit or accept any mediation from any, even the most friendly quarters."⁶

In fact, he used every opportunity to maintain cordial relations with Great Britain. When he heard of the friendly reception of the American minister, he instructed Seward to let the British know of his satisfaction. As the latter put it in a letter to the legate, "The President is solicitous to show his high appreciation of every demonstration of consideration for the United States which the British government feels itself at liberty to make. He instructs me, therefore, to say that the prompt and cordial manner in which you were received...is very gratifying to this government." Lord Richard B. Lyons, the British minister in Washington, was fully aware of Lincoln's peaceful attitude toward the United Kingdom. According to Lord John Russell, the British foreign secretary, he reported that a declaration of war was not impossible but also stated, "The danger of war was averted by President Lincoln, who had no wish to add to his difficulties by challenging one or more of the European Powers."⁷

One of the problems with Great Britain, as with others, was the question of the 1856 Declaration of Paris. In four paragraphs, it decided that privateering be abolished, that neutral flags protected enemy goods, except contraband, and that blockades, to be valid, must be effective. Because it insisted upon an addition to article one exempting private property of belligerents, the United States refused to adhere to the convention at that time. But involved in civil war and anxious to stop privateering by the Confederates, it was willing to reconsider its stand, only to find that the British government insisted on the addition of a clause that "her Majesty does not intend thereby to undertake any engagement which will have any bearing, direct or indirect, on the internal differences now prevailing in the United States." This was wholly unacceptable to the authorities in Washington, particularly to the president. Adams then suggested letting matters rest, but in this, he wrote, "I remain to be directed at the pleasure of the President." The United States never did adhere to the British declaration.⁸

Of course it was the president who on April 19 established the blockade of the Southern coast, a matter of great concern to foreign powers, especially Great Britain, which maintained the world's largest military and commercial fleets. While Britain pro-



William H. Seward, Engraving by Johnson Fry & Co., 1862 (TLM #2222)


tested, it nevertheless recognized the blockade as effective—if any obstruction of thousands of miles of coast can be so called.

Then there was the problem of British consuls in Confederate territory. Robert Bunch at Charleston had forwarded some letters apparently helping the Confederates, with whom he seemed to sympathize. The president repeatedly insisted on his removal, while assuring the British that he would cheerfully issue an exequatur to any successor who would faithfully perform his functions without injury to the rights and the interests of the United States. But the British resisted.⁹

In Great Britain, as in general, it was in connection with the *Trent* affair that Lincoln's primary authority in foreign affairs emerged most clearly. When Captain Charles Wilkes of the USS *San Jacinto* captured the Confederate envoys James M. Mason and John Slidell on board the British packet boat *Trent*, the question of how to deal with the incident became a major problem in Washington. From the very beginning, Lincoln doubted the legality of the seizure. As he said to the attorney general two days after the apprehension, "I am not getting much sleep out of that exploit of Wilkes," and I suppose we must look up the law of the case. I am not much of a prize lawyer, but it seems to me pretty clear that if Wilkes saw fit

to make that capture on the high seas he had no right to turn his quarter deck into a prize court." Yet he was not totally immune to the general exhilaration about the seizure. As he wrote to Edward Everett, "The items of news coming last week were all satisfactory...The success at Port Royal was both splendid and important. The military men are taking what they consider all necessary steps to hold the places taken. And then the capture of Mason & Slidell!" In fact, the *New York Herald* reported that it was said the president would not give up the prisoners even if it meant war with England. That this was an absurdity is evident; his entire foreign policy rested on the conviction that he had to avoid any foreign war, "One war at a time," being his motto. For a while, he considered arbitration. But he soon found that that would not do. Having dispatched Thurlow Weed, Archbishop John J. Hughes, General Winfield Scott, and Episcopal Bishop Charles P. McIlvaine to Europe to counteract Confederate propaganda, he heard from Weed that the British were preparing for war if the two men were not surrendered and that the matter was very serious. And indeed, on December 20, Lord Lyons presented to Seward the British ultimatum demanding reparations and the immediate return of the envoys.¹⁰

The following cabinet meeting was a very anxious one. After the other members had retired, Lincoln said to his secretary of state, "Governor Seward, you will go on, of course, preparing your answer, which, as I understand, will state the reasons why they ought to be given up. Now I have a mind to try my hand at stating the reasons why they ought not to be given up. We will prepare the point on each side." As David H. Donald has pointed out, this was merely Lincoln's way to getting the secretary to support his decision to surrender the captives. On the next day, Seward presented his argument in favor. When Lincoln consented, the secretary reminded him of his promise to present the other side. Smiling, the president shook his head and said, "I found I could not make an argument that will satisfy my own mind, and that proved to me your ground was the right one."



Charles Francis Adams (TLM #3456)

After further cabinet meetings, including one on Christmas day when Charles Sumner, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, was present and read letters from James Cobden and John Bright, the English liberals, about the necessity of the release, the message, expressing satisfaction that the British government had finally agreed to America's position in the War of 1812, of not searching neutral ships, was sent. Mason and Slidell with the associates were returned, and Lincoln had certainly exercised his ultimate authority in diplomacy.¹¹

The next controversy in which the president made his authority clear involved the actions of the colonial government of Nassau. Protesting the denial of the right of American ships to take coal there, Adams wrote to Earl Russell, "Liberal as is the position of the government of the United States in its intercourse with all Foreign nations, in American waters the President declines to believe that Her Majesty's Government have sanctioned or will sanction these proceedings on the part of the authorities of Nassau. Should he prove to have been correct in this opinion, I am directed to solicit of your lordship such action in the proper quarter as may lead to rectification of the error."¹²

Other matters in our relations with the United Kingdom concerned European intervention in Mexico. Following a tripartite action of Great Britain, France, and Spain, rumors of their intention of setting up a monarchy there—a project eventually carried out by France—reached the United States. This possibility naturally distressed the administration. Assuring the British once again that the United States was deeply concerned but wanted to remain on good relations with Europe, Adams wrote Russell, "The President has therefore instructed me to submit his views on the new aspect of affairs to the parties concerned. He has relied on the assurances given to this Government by the Allies that they were seeking no political objects; and only a redress of grievances," but he considered it his duty to warn the powers that no monarchical government in Mexico founded by foreign powers could have any prospect of permanence and would contribute to instability.¹³

In the spring of 1862, anxious to satisfy British sentiments on the subject, the president exchanged a treaty with Great Britain to outlaw the slave trade, and Seward ordered Adams to express to Russell "the satisfaction with which the President has learned that Her Majesty's Government has given a prompt and cordial adherence to a measure which he hoped and believes will bring to a speedy end an unlawful and inhuman traffic whose calamities, while they have fallen most heavily on two countries have afflicted the whole world." Lincoln also began to pursue an antislavery policy partially to counter efforts by Southern sympathizers in Great Britain to bring about the recognition of the Confederacy.¹⁴

The president was also deeply engaged in American relations with France. As early as May 19, 1861, William L. Dayton, the newly appointed American minister in Paris, wrote to Napoleon III, "I have it especially in charge from the President of the United States to give assurances to your Imperial Majesty of his disposition to cultivate...friendly relations; to assure your Majesty personally of his high respect and appreciation; to tender to you, to the Empress, your imperial consort, and to each of the members of the imperial family, his best wishes for their

health, prosperity, and happiness.”¹⁵ Again and again Lincoln let Dayton know how satisfied he was with his performance. He also repeatedly emphasized that he had the friendliest feelings for the country. Of course, as with Great Britain, he resented the granting of belligerent rights to the Confederacy. And he made it clear at the very beginning that he did not want any sort of foreign interference in American affairs. According to the secretary of state, “The President neither expects nor desires any intervention, or any favor, from the government of France, or any other, in this emergency.” He also informed him that Lincoln was taking into consideration the question of America’s joining the Convention of Paris, although he was still interested in the amendment exempting private property from seizure on neutral vessels. Although he left no doubt for Dayton that he considered the proclamation of neutrality injurious and rejected any sort of mediation, he insisted that he was turning away “from these points of apprehended difference of opinion between the two governments to notice other and more agreeable subjects.” Communications to both Britain and France were to be sent during the current week, but Seward reserved comment upon them “until they shall thus be fully and directly brought to the attention of the President.” In 1862, the president’s efforts to keep France from interfering continued. His March 6 call on the border states to free their slaves in return for compensation made a good impression in Paris; and on the 26th, he emphasized once again that he had not indulged during all his troubles a sentiment or feeling that was not earnestly generous and friendly towards all foreign states, and especially so toward the government and people of France. He even approved of a trip to Richmond by Henri Mercier, the French minister in Washington, who had hopes of bringing about some sort of pacification.¹⁶

When raiders were being fitted out in France to serve the Confederacy, Seward stated, “The President knows that France has wished us well. Would it not be well for her to signalize her aversion for the designs of the European conspirators?” Lincoln expressed his satisfaction with Foreign Secretary Edouard Thouvenel’s refusal to accede to the Confederates’ demands for recognition, and he gave special authority to Dayton to negotiate about the Declaration of Paris. Perturbed as he was by Napoleon’s interference in Mexico, he wanted Foreign Secretary Edouard Thouvenel to know that he was meeting all the president’s expectations in regard to Mexico as he said that all that France wanted was to settle her existing debts, not to change the government. And after M. Thouvenel was replaced by Edmond Drouyn de l’Huys in October 1862, he expressed his real satisfaction with the new foreign minister’s explanation of the Emperor’s views in regard to American affairs.¹⁷

French interference in Mexico presented a serious problem for the United States. Worried about reports of French interests in Texas as well, Lincoln expressed his satisfaction with Drouyn de l’Huys’ voluntary explanation denying any French designs there. And as late as in April 1863, he still believed that Napoleon III had no purpose in assuming, in the event of success, the government of “that republic,” and attitude he confirmed once again three months later. But when Maximilian was set up as emperor, Lincoln refused to recognize the new government.¹⁸

In spite of further difficulties with the second empire, particularly in regard to insurgent raiders in French harbors to which Dayton protested vigorously, the president deemed it “not unbecoming to express his profound regret that a necessity for so serious a complaint has arisen in our intercourse with France—an intercourse in which everything on our part has been conducted in the spirit of earnest and sincere friendship—which is believed to have been hitherto beneficial to both countries.” And just before he was assassinated, he expressed his attitude in favor of American participation in the international exposition of productions and agriculture planned in Paris for 1867.¹⁹

Lincoln was also involved with other countries. This can be seen particularly in the case of Japan. As early as in May 1861, the Tycoon, the title of the Tokugawa Shogun, wrote to Lincoln that he wanted the opening of the harbors of Yedo and Osaka postponed. He might have agreed, but when the secretary of the legation at Yedo, C.J. Hensker, was murdered, he opposed the request. As he wrote back on August 1, he would like to accede, but American interests had to be safeguarded. He suggested cooperation with other powers and proposed “that the powers should announce to the government of Japan their willingness and purpose to make common cause and to cooperate with this government in exacting satisfaction, if the Japanese government should not at once put forth all possible effort to secure the punishment of the assassins of Mr. Hensker, and also in making requisitions with signal vigor if any insult or injury should be committed against any foreigner residing in Yedo...” After the departure of Townsend Harris, America’s first representative in Japan, the president gave frequent instructions to his successor, Robert H. Pruyn, who was informed that “The President learns with sincere pleasure that your relations with the government [of Japan] are cordial and satisfactory.”²⁰

But relations with Japan became more and more difficult. The Mikado, as the emperor was called, supported anti-foreign elements in a controversy with the Shogun. The result was the assassination of various Europeans and Americans. Seward informed Pruyn, “The President has received with profound emotion the information that some unknown Japanese subjects have assassinated British marines, stationed at her Majesty’s legation for the protection of the minister.” He wanted to know whether there had been any delinquency on Pruyn’s part, and when he received the appropriate report, was satisfied that the minister’s proceedings had been the best that could have been adopted. Further difficulties finally led to joint military action against Shimonoseki, a procedure Lincoln specifically authorized.²¹

China, too, concerned the president. After the Austrian Emperor refused to receive Anson Burlingame who had defended Louis Kossuth, the Hungarian nationalist, and the Austrian minister in Washington threatened to resign because of the appointment, he sent Burlingame to Peking, where there were problems involving the Taiping rebellion ravaging the country. Lincoln was deeply concerned about the safety of American citizens in Ningpo and Shanghai, but he wanted the embassy to do nothing to disturb the imperial government. The minister was instructed “to express the President’s acknowledgments to the Emperor of the seasonable and friendly notice given to you by his order concerning His Majesty’s intended demonstration for the conquest of Ningpo, then

occupied by the rebels." After the minister presented a friendly letter from Lincoln to the Emperor of the Ta Tsing dynasty, the latter saluted "his Majesty, the President of the United States." When China adopted a flag, Lincoln expressed his pleasure and directed the navy to render it all honors.²²

In Spain, the German-American Republican Carl Schurz, whom Lincoln had appointed minister to Madrid contrary to Seward's demand that he be sent to Latin America, received the president's instructions for the discharge of his mission at the very beginning of his embassy. Seward wrote, "The President, in the absence of all information, is left to conjecture what are the influences by which the so-called Confederate States rely to induce her Catholic Majesty's government to grant their disloyal application. The high consideration which he entertains for her Majesty enables him to assume that the appeal taken from this government to her royal favor, proceeds, in part at least, on the ground that the revolutionists affect to have suffered oppression and wrong at the hands of the government of the United States, which entitle them to the sympathy of the Queen of Spain, through her intervention." He would, not, however, rely very much on the forbearance of any foreign powers, not even of that of Spain. He forbade the issue of any ultimatum to the kingdom after its recapture of Santo Domingo.²³

As in other countries, the succor of Confederate raiders in Spanish ports caused trouble. The Spanish minister in Washington was informed that Seward was "instructed by the President of the United States to inform the Spanish government that he deems the admittance of said piratical vessel, the Sumter...to have been in violation of the treaties existing between this government and Spain, as well as of the law of nations..." Upon Spain's promise to collaborate, Schurz informed the foreign minister, Calderon Collantes, that the president had read with pleasure the proclamation of her Majesty about the United States, and that it afforded him "the sincerest pleasure to express to your excellency the high sense which the President entertains of her Majesty's prompt decision and friendly action upon this occasion." When Spain proceeded to warlike actions in Peru, the Spanish government was informed "that the President feels a deep interest in the preservation of peace between these countries."²⁴

In connection with Scandinavia, too, many examples of the president's involvement in diplomacy can be shown. The American minister to Denmark, Bradford R. Wood, was instructed that "The one subject in all our foreign relations which most anxiously engages the President's attention is the possible action of other nations in regard to the domestic controversy which is raging within our own borders." When the Danish foreign minister expressed himself favorably toward the administration and unfriendly toward the insurgents, Seward informed the minister that "the President instructs me to say that the explanation of the views of the Danish government given to you by Mr. Hall, the minister of foreign affairs, is very satisfactory." Comparable instructions went to the minister to Sweden, to whose king Lincoln sent two pistols in recognition of the country's friendship for the United States. He received a book in return.²⁵

Similar examples can be cited for other countries. Thomas Corwin in Mexico was informed that conditions in that country were so

imperfectly understood that the president found it difficult to give him particular directions. Shortly afterward, he was instructed about the fact that the president wanted Mexico to retain its independence and hoped for order there. Henry Sanford in Brussels was told, "The President willingly expects to rely on your astuteness in discovering points of attack and your practical skill and experience in protecting the interests of the United States." In the neighboring Netherlands, James S. Pike, the American representative, learned that the president was gratified "with the just and proper sentiments expressed by the government of Holland concerning the United States," and in December 1862 Pike learned that Lincoln was "disposed to take a much more cheering view of our foreign relations, at this time, than he has allowed himself to indulge at any previous period since the civil war commenced." He expressed analogous feelings concerning his satisfaction with their attitudes about Russia and Brazil.²⁶

Constitutionally charged with the responsibility of making diplomatic appointments, the president freely exercised this responsibility. Even though the two collaborated freely, it was not Seward but Lincoln who directed the appointment of abolitionists to foreign posts. Even John M. Taylor, in his laudatory biography of the secretary, admitted, "Seward had a major voice, though not the final say, in the choice of envoys to serve abroad."²⁷ For example, on March 17, 1861, the president wrote to his secretary, "I believe it a necessity with us to make the appointments I mentioned last night—that is, Charles F. Adams to England, William L. Dayton to France, George P. Marsh to Sardinia, and Anson Burlingame to Austria. These gentlemen all have my highest esteem, but no one is originally supported by me except Mr. Dayton. Mr. Adams I take because you suggested him coupled with his eminent fitness for the place. Mr. Marsh and Mr. Burlingame I take because of the intense pressure of their respective states, and their fitness also. The objection to this card is that, locally they are so huddled up—three being in New England, and two from a single state. I have considered this and will not shrink from the responsibility. This being done leaves but five full missions indisposed of—Russia, China, Brazil, Peru & Chile. And then what about Carl Schurz? Or, in other words, what about our german [sic] friends? Shall we put the card through and arrange the rest afterward? What say you?" As already mentioned, he finally sent Schurz to Spain.²⁸

Lincoln's full involvement in diplomatic appointments continued. For example, on October 29, 1861, he wrote to Seward to oblige one of his supporters by appointing his nominee to the consulate in Jerusalem, if the post was open. Even critics admitted that the president was in charge of appointments. Benjamin Moran, the assistant secretary of the London legation, did not have much of an opinion of Lincoln. "So far as my observations go, Mr. Lincoln's consular appointments are the very worst yet made in my time," he wrote in November 1861, naturally referring to the president's primacy in these actions. When Seward, whom Lincoln had asked to make some change in the consulate at Hawaii, suggested sending Bradford R. Wood to the island, Lincoln replied, "It won't do—we must have a tip-top man there next time." As late as February 20, 1865, Lincoln was still asked for an appointment for Theodore Schnitzler to Berlin. One month later, when James Roosevelt wanted the legation in The Hague, he asked the secre-

tary whether there was any possibility of obtaining it if he brought the necessary influence to bear upon the president.²⁹

The president also took a direct part in sending missions abroad. As Jay Monaghan pointed out, during the crisis of Captain Charles Wilkes' capture of the Confederate emissaries to Europe, James Mason and John Slidell, Lincoln dispatched Thurlow Weed, General Scott, Archbishop John J. Hughes, and Episcopal Bishop Charles P. McIlvaine to Europe to counteract the influence of the capture of the two Confederate emissaries. They went to England and France, and Weed contacted the Baring Brothers for funds for the purchase of arms. As Seward informed Charles Francis Adams, they were being sent to Europe to counteract Confederate propaganda. "Bishop McIlvaine, of Ohio...", he wrote, "has kindly offered his services, which, as he has the entire confidence of both the President and myself, has been promptly and cheerfully accepted." The archbishop dutifully approved of the mission upon which he was to embark. "It may turn out unsuccessful," he wrote to Seward, "but whether or not I look upon it as a measure of large and in our actual circumstance, exceedingly wise statesmanship."³⁰

Adams conferred frequently with the men and considered their services of material use to the cause. The most active of the three, Weed, took side trips to Paris, where he considered the envoy, Dayton, capable but impeded by his inability to speak French. He continued to peruse British newspapers, concluded that John Bull was "somewhat less rampant" than he expected, and complained about the French and British press putting him in an absurdly false position. He tried to turn back hostile opinion, and found that the Trent crisis was very dangerous. Warning Seward and Lincoln that the British were preparing for war if Mason and Slidell were not surrendered and that the matter was very serious, he pleaded forbearance. "Let me beseech you..." he warned, "to turn the other cheek rather than smite back, at present." He stayed after the affair was settled, went once more to Paris, and reported on French objections to the closing of blockaded harbors.³¹

Hughes also went to Paris. He saw Napoleon III, blessed the little prince, and published an article in the *Debats*. In Rome, he defended the president against a cardinal, who compared Lincoln unfavorably with Seward, by insisting that the United States never had a more capable, honest, and competent president, only to be told that it was all a misunderstanding, and that the cardinal had said "precedent," not "president." McIlvaine performed similar services.³²

Thus, it can be seen that the president was, indeed, very much involved in diplomacy. He collaborated with Seward, but Lincoln never abandoned his diplomatic role.

Endnotes

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² Fredrick Seward, *Reminiscences of a War-Time Statesman and Diplomat 1830–1915* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1916), p. 147.

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⁶ Seward to C. F. Adams, June 3, 19, 1861; *FA* 1861, 97–98; 106–09.

⁷ *Ibid.*; G. P. Gooch, ed., *The Later Correspondence of Lord John Russell 1840–1878* (2 vols., London: Longmans, Green, 1925) II, 317.

⁸ Lincoln to ministers in signatory countries, April 24, 1861; Seward to Adams July 1, 1861, Russell to Adams, July 18, 1861, Adams to Seward September 7, 1861, *FA*, 1861, 34–36, 111–12, 116, 144; Lord Russell to Baron Lyons, May 18, 1861, *File Copies of the Records in the National Archives* (Hereafter cited as *NA*), 77; Adams to Seward, August 23, September 7, 1861, Charles Francis Adams Papers, Historical Society of Massachusetts.

⁹ *Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of the Rebellion* (28 vols., Washington: National Printing Office, 1896), I, IV, 156–57; Adams to Seward, May 21, 1861, *FA*, 1861, 90–96.

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¹² Charles F. Adams to Lord Russell, February 24, 1862, Adams Papers.

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¹³ Charles F. Adams to Lord Russell, March 3, 1862, *NA*, 77.

¹⁴ Seward to Charles Francis Adams, June 7, 1862, *NA*, 77, March 10, 1862.

¹⁵ William L. Dayton to Napoleon III, *FA*, 1861 and 1862, pp. 211–12.

¹⁶ Seward to Dayton, April 22, 1861, May 30, 1861, March 26, 1862, April 2, 1862, Dayton to Seward, March 26, 1862, November 10, 1862, Seward to Dayton, May 14, June 22, July 1, 1861, William L. Dayton Papers, Princeton University.

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